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Abstract
We propose a theory of the economic advantage (EA) of regulating carbon emissions
by linking two emissions trading systems versus operating them under autarky. Link-
ing implies that permits issued in one system can be traded internationally for use
in the other. We show how the nature of uncertainty, market sizes, and sunk costs
of linking determine EA. Even when sunk costs are small so EA>0, autarky can be
preferable to one partner, depending on jurisdiction characteristics. Moreover, one
partner’s permit price volatility under linking may increase without making linking
the less preferred option. An empirical application calibrates jurisdiction character-
istics to demonstrate the economic significance of our results which can make linking
partner match crucial for the effectiveness and success of the Paris Agreement.
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1 Introduction
Markets for emission permits have long been an important climate policy tool in driv-
ing emission reduction efforts in a cost-effective and flexible way. The Paris Agreement
(2015), adopted by 195 countries during the 21st Conference of Parties (COP21), has been
interpreted as encouraging the use of these markets (Stavins (2016)). World Bank (2015)
identifies one region consisting of 31 nations, eight individual nations and 23 sub-national
jurisdictions which currently regulate carbon emissions using emissions trading systems
(ETSs), and 13 additional ETSs are at various stages of development. The increasing
number of planned and proposed systems suggests that a bottom-up policy architecture
in which these systems interact will be a significant element of the global climate change
policy framework in the future (European Commission (2015), The Economist (2015),
and The Financial Times (2015)).
In fact, some systems have already linked, meaning one recognizes the other’s permits
for compliance and vice versa. There is an active link between the ETSs of Quebec
and California, the so-called Western Climate Initiative (WCI), which four US states
(New York, Vermont, Oregon and Washington) and two Canadian provinces (Ontario and
Manitoba) have expressed interest in joining. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI) in the northeastern United States is effectively a system of jurisdictions with
linked ETSs. Recently, the EU and Switzerland have concluded negotiations to link the
European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) to the Swiss system, although the
link is not yet active. Egypt, Vietnam, and Mexico announced plans to launch domestic
ETSs that could link to other carbon markets.
In this paper we use a simple theoretical framework to quantify the economic advantage
of linking over autarky, hereafter EA, and study how it depends on the combination of
shocks affecting each jurisdiction and the jurisdictions’ sizes; we refer to this combination
as pair characteristics. A jurisdiction in this context is the set of entities that are under
the control of a regulator who can design policies independently of regulators in other
jurisdictions. We focus on bilateral links between jurisdictions and say that the ETSs are
linked if the regulators in both jurisdictions agreed ex ante that the permits issued in one
can be surrendered against compliance requirements in the other. Throughout we assume
competitive permit trading.
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We find that aggregate EA is increasing in jurisdictions’ sizes and shock variances, but
decreasing in the correlation of shocks and the exogenous sunk costs of linking. The
latter includes the costs of negotiating the linking agreement, harmonizing the rules of the
previously independent systems, setting up a platform for inter-jurisdictional transactions
and other administrative costs. Some of these costs have already been recognized in the
Paris Agreement (2015).
A novel contribution of our paper is to analyze how aggregate EA is distributed between
the linking jurisdictions as a function of pair characteristics and the level of sunk costs.
Specifically, we identify the conditions under which one jurisdiction is worse off even when
aggregate EA is positive. Put differently, some linking partner matches, what we call
carbon dates, generate greater value than others and for some carbon dates one partner
can be worse off than staying single. When looking for a carbon date, our model helps
answer the question: who is a good match?
Our framework also allows us to evaluate the permit price volatility under autarky and
linking. We find that price volatility may increase or decrease relative to autarky depend-
ing on pair characteristics, and note that linking may be beneficial for a jurisdiction even
if its price volatility increases under linking.
To put our analytical results into context, we calibrate pair characteristics to historical
emissions data of ten key jurisdictions and evaluate aggregate and jurisdiction-specific
EAs. The jurisdictions we consider include individual nations, a supranational region, as
well as sub- and supranational sectors, reflecting the recent discussions among climate
policy negotiators at COP21. This empirical exercise demonstrates that there is substan-
tial, economically meaningful, and policy relevant variation among possible links between
jurisdictions and confirms that the ‘linking partner match’ is not a trivial exercise.
Our theoretical model is an adaptation of the static model in Weitzman (1974) to two
jurisdictions and to the case where pollution is uniformly mixed. It is similar in spirit to
the multi-firm case considered in Yohe (1976) and the multinational production location
decision studied in De Meza and Van der Ploeg (1987). However, in Yohe (1976) shocks
are identically distributed and the comparative advantage of a uniform tax over a quantity
standard is computed as a function of industry size. Here we are interested in the difference
between the net benefits associated with two quantity instruments operated under linking
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and autarky, and place no restrictions on the distribution of the shocks. In De Meza
and Van der Ploeg (1987) the sizes of plants are irrelevant, shocks are plant-specific and
the objective of the multinational is to maximize profit by relocating production across
plants in different counties. Cost and production levels at individual plants matter only
to the extent that they contribute towards this objective. Accordingly, our focus on
jurisdiction-specific EA is an important conceptual difference from this study.
Similarly, Yates (2002) develops a general framework for analyzing the aggregate economic
advantage of trading permits across divisions within the same jurisdiction. These divi-
sions can be interpreted as time, firms, regions with varying geographic and institutional
characteristics, etc. In his framework a single regulator decides whether to allow trading
across divisions. Yates finds that in the case of uniformly mixed pollutants, decentralized
trading across divisions is optimal and should be adopted by the regulator.1
Yates (2002) anticipates our finding that when sunk costs are small, inter-jurisdiction
trading is preferable from a social perspective. However, that linking will be adopted is
not a forgone conclusion when regulators in each jurisdiction (often but not exclusively
sovereign countries), must agree to trading. To show this we unpack the comparative
advantage formula in Yates (2002) by decomposing aggregate economic advantage into
three readily interpretable quantities, namely volatility, dependence, and pair size effects.
This allows us to discipline how the three effects jointly operate in theory, and to evaluate
their economic significance using real world data.
As described by Flachsland et al. (2009) and Jaffe et al. (2009), linked jurisdictions will
tend to experience reduced price volatility because domestic shocks are spread over a larger
market. We clarify the conditions under which the conventional view does not apply. A
similar effect has recently been observed by Caselli et al. (2015) in the international trade
context as well. Openness to international trade can lower GDP volatility when country-
specific shocks are the most important source of volatility. Hence, there is scope for
diversification through trade. However, declines in GDP volatility due to international
trade is by no means guaranteed.
Finally, Flachsland et al. (2009) and Jotzo and Betz (2009) comment on the relevance of
1Interpreting divisions as time periods, Yates and Cronshaw (2001), Williams (2002) and Fell et al.
(2012) show that banking and borrowing provisions can be an optimal regulatory response to cost shocks.
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increased liquidity and argue that the largest economic benefit comes from linking large
ETSs. Our pair size effect captures and qualifies this result. It is an increasing function
of each jurisdiction’s size. Crucially, the increase in EA consequent to an increase in the
size of a given jurisdiction makes it and its partner better off, but not equally so because
the latter captures a greater share of the increase in value.
The policy literature on linking also mentions a host of other benefits and costs which are
hard to quantify in our simple economic analysis. For example, linking provides oppor-
tunities to improve the administration and governance of linked permit markets. Insofar
as linking leads to the alignment of the administration and design of markets, it stream-
lines the compliance process and can lead to reduced administrative costs for businesses
operating in those jurisdictions. Moreover, the benefits of linking can have ramifications
that go beyond the geographical jurisdiction of the linking partners. Indeed, linking can
lead to a leveling of the international playing field and to an improved support of global
cooperation for tackling climate change. At the same time, the process of linking can
require significant and costly efforts that may discourage it despite the potential benefits.
These include the alignment of technical requirements (e.g. monitoring, reporting and
verification (MRV), and tracking systems) and of design features (e.g. level of ambition,
mode of allocation, inter-temporal flexibility, price management rules) all of which have to
be negotiated. Papers focusing on various aspects of these issues include Flachsland et al.
(2009), Ranson and Stavins (2015), Burtraw et al. (2013), and Bodansky et al. (2015).
Others have explored the strategic implications of linking. Helm (2003), Rehdanz and
Tol (2005), Carbone et al. (2009), and Holtsmark and Midttomme (2015) investigate the
incentives to alter domestic emission caps when national permit markets are linked. Pizer
and Yates (2015) investigate the implications of a delink clause on market outcomes under
linking and propose the inclusion of flexible delinking provisions. Finally, a series of recent
papers examines the club as a model for international climate policy (Nordhaus (2015),
Victor (2015), Green et al. (2014) and Keohane et al. (2015)).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and defines jurisdiction-
specific and aggregate EA. The analytical results and the empirical application can be
found in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 discusses the implications of relaxing the key model
assumptions. Section 6 concludes. An appendix contains the derivations and proofs.
5
2 Theoretical model and equilibrium
Our analysis relies on a simple static model that specializes Weitzman (1974) and Yohe
(1976) to the case of quantity-based policies designed to regulate uniformly mixed pollu-
tion in two countries with independent regulatory authorities.2 The total benefits from
emissions in country i are a function of the level of emissions qi ≥ 0 and are subject to
country-specific shocks θi
Bi(qi, θi) = b0 + (b1 + θi)qi − b2
2ψi
q2i where i = 1, 2.
The coefficients b0, b1, b2 ≥ 0 are identical across countries. We characterize and discuss
the shocks in detail below. The parameter ψi > 0 controls the level of emissions in country
i. To see this, consider the cost-minimizing response to an arbitrary positive permit price
p in the absence of shocks, i.e. b1− b2ψi qi = p. Then ψ1 > ψ2 implies that q1 > q2. We refer
to this as country 1 being greater in size. Note that ψ1 > ψ2 does not imply that country
1 is larger along other economic dimensions.3
There is an alternative and observationally equilvalent interpreration of the coefficient ψi
as a measure of country-specific abatement technology. In this interpretation, assuming
all else is equal, ψ1 > ψ2 corresponds to country 1 having access to lower-cost abatement
opportunities at the margin. We discuss the implications of allowing for diffferences in
technology as well as size in Section 5.
Carbon dioxide is a uniformly mixed stock pollutant and total climate change damages in
each country are a function of aggregate quantity emitted, q1 + q2. Accordingly, we have
Di(q1 + q2) = d0 + d1(q1 + q2) +
d2
2
(q1 + q2)
2,
where d0, d1, d2 ≥ 0. We assume that the effect of exogenous and fixed emissions from
the rest of the world are subsumed in these parameters. Note that the level of aggregate
2Jurisdiction is more appropriate since ETSs can be set up and linked, at sectoral, subnational,
national or regional levels. We use country for brevity in Sections 2 and 3.
3On average, Canadian emissions are greater than Brazilian emissions, which would imply ψCAN >
ψBRA. This is true despite the fact that Brazil’s real GDP and population are, respectively, twice and
five times larger than Canada’s.
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damages corresponds to the sum D1(q1 + q2) +D2(q1 + q2).
The rest of this section illustrates the source of the economic advantage of linking, first
informally in a deterministic setting with arbitrary quotas, and then in a stochastic set-
ting where quotas are such that expected permit prices under autarky are equal across
countries. Then to proceed formally we state our assumptions regarding the shocks θi.
Finally, we discuss how the regulators set the quotas under linking and autarky which
allows us to charactherize the equilibiria subject to these quotas.
Suppose that the countries are identical in every respect except that country 1 is larger
(ψ1 > ψ2). For illustration purposes, Figure 1 assumes the two countries impose the same
quota on emissions despite the difference in size (qˆ1 = qˆ2). This implies a higher autarky
price in country 1 and an inefficiency in the way emission reductions are allocated across
countries due to the price wedge wˆ. Under linking, the price difference is eliminated as
permits flow from country 2 to 1 until both countries face the same price pˆL. In a sense,
linking increases the cap in the high-price country and reduces it by the same amount in
the low-price country leaving the aggregate cap unchanged. Both countries gain from the
reallocation of emission reductions. The marginal benefit curves MBi, quotas qˆi, the price
wedge wˆ and the linking equilibrium price pˆL are illustrated in Figure 1.
Next, suppose the countries set their quotas so that each country’s autarky price is equal
to pˆL. Denoting these quotas q˜1 and q˜2 in Figure 1, we note that there is no longer
any incentive to trade. Now assume that a positive shock occurs in country 1 and shifts
its marginal benefit curve up to MB′1. This opens up another wedge w˜ between the
autarky prices and creates potential gains from trade. If the two ETSs are linked, the
post-shock price difference that we would have observed under autarky is immediately
eliminated and the linking equilibrium price p˜L efficiently reallocates emission reductions
across countries to realize the potential gains from trade. But how are the total benefits
and their distribution between the two countries determined? The shaded triangles in
Figure 1 shed light on this question. They suggest that the magnitude of the shock and
ψi play a key role. We develop this idea analytically in the next section.
We now specify the nature of the shocks in more detail. Specifically, we assume that
country-specific shocks are limited to the intercepts of the marginal benefit schedules.
These shocks capture the net effect of factors that may influence emissions and their
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associated benefits such as business cycle and technology shocks, country-specific events,
changes in the prices of factors of production, weather fluctuations, etc. For example, a
favorable aggregate total factor productivity shock would increase the benefits of emissions
and in our model would correspond to θi > 0.4
The shock distributions and their variance-covariance matrix, are at the heart of our
analysis. We impose minimal restrictions: shocks are mean-zero, constant variance, and
possibly correlated random variables.5 That is, for i = 1, 2 we define
E(θi) = 0,
V (θi) = σ
2
i , (1)
Corr(θ1, θ2) = ρ ∈ [−1, 1].
Also, we assume that b1 + θi > 0 for every possible realization of the shock. This assump-
tion ensures that without regulation, the marginal benefit of emissions is always positive
and the emission control problem under investigation is non-trivial.
We refer to the combination of shock characteristics and country sizes in a given pair as
pair characteristics and denote it as {(ψ1, σ1), (ψ2, σ2), ρ}. Finally, we introduce the sunk
cost of linking  ≥ 0. We assume that aggregate sunk costs are exogenous, proportional
to the size of the linked systems, and shared according to country size. That is, given
pair characteristics, the total linking cost is (ψ1 + ψ2) where country 1 incurs ψ1.
In what follows we analyze the case where the regulator in each country sets its quota so
as to maximize its net benefits under autarky taking the other country’s quota choice as
given. The resulting non-cooperative equilibrium quota pair, characterized in Appendix
A, is denoted as (q¯1, q¯2).6 We assume that the quotas remain the same under both autarky
and linking so that aggregate outcomes under the two regimes are comparable.
Given these quotas, the regulator in each country faces a simple choice between two
4Below, we interpret these shocks as being related to the cyclical components of emissions obtained
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
5We assume mean-zero shocks for convenience. Our results hold for E(θi) 6= E(θj) 6= 0.
6Appendix A also characterizes the cooperative solution to the quota-setting problem and shows that
the analytical results about the aggregate benefits of linking remain unaltered. In fact, any other quota
pair that generates the same expected price under autarky would not alter our results.
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options: operating an ETS under autarky, where the competitive equilibrium is denoted
by the pairs (pAi, qAi) for i = 1, 2, or linking the system with the other country’s ETS, in
which case the competitive equilibrium is given by the triple (pL, qL1, qL2). The regulators
make this choice by comparing the level of expected net benefits under autarky to expected
net benefits under linking. Linking takes place only when both regulators agree ex ante
to link.
Throughout the paper we restrict our attention to interior equilibria and discuss the
implications of relaxing this assumption in Section 5. The autarky equilibrium (AE) in
country i is given by
(pAi, qAi) = (b1 − b2
ψi
q¯i + θi, q¯i). (2)
In words, the autarky equilibrium quantity is fixed at the level of the quota, the equi-
librium price is positive, increasing in the country’s own shock but is independent of the
other country’s shock.
In order to characterize the linking equilibrium (LE) we define n ∈ [−q¯2, q¯1] as the number
of permits exported from country 1 to country 2 with the understanding that when n < 0,
country 1 imports permits. In an LE,7
(pL, qL1, qL2) =
(
K +
ψ1θ1 + ψ2θ2
ψ1 + ψ2
, q¯1 − n, q¯2 + n
)
, (3)
where the constant K and n are
K = b1 − b2 (b1 − d1)
b2 + d2 (ψ1 + ψ2)
and n =
1
b2
ψ1ψ2
(ψ1 + ψ2)
(θ2 − θ1) .
In particular, the country with the higher shock will import permits because the regulated
entities there place a greater value on permits. As illustrated earlier, linking increases the
effective cap in the high-shock country and reduces it by the same amount in the low-shock
country leaving the aggregate cap unchanged.8
7The full characterization of the autarky and linking equilibria, including the corner solutions, is
available upon request.
8This is the market-based analog of the outcome approximated using regulator-imposed trading ratios
in Holland and Yates (2015) and Muller and Mendelsohn (2009).
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Economic advantage under linking versus autarky
We are finally in a position to address the question raised in the title of the paper. To
that end we define the country-specific EA (δi) as the difference between the net benefits
under linking minus the net benefits under autarky given exogenous, country-specific
sunk costs of linking, ψi ≥ 0. We define aggregate EA (∆) as the sum of country-specific
advantages.9
Under autarky, permit costs and initial owners’ rents cancel out. However, they differ in
value under linking. In fact, when country 1 exports its permits, it reduces its emissions
below q¯1 and sells unused permits at pL > pA1. Country 2, instead, imports permits
and increases its emissions beyond its cap. Linking allows country 2’s private benefits of
emissions to increase, yet at a lower overall permit cost because pL < pA2.
Making use of the interior equilibrium assumption, we obtain:
δ1 = B1(q¯1 − n, θ1)−B1(q¯1, θ1) + pLn− ψ1,
δ2 = B2(q¯2 + n, θ2)−B2(q¯2, θ2)− pLn− ψ2, (4)
∆ = [B1(q¯1 − n, θ1) +B2(q¯2 + n, θ2)]− [B1(q¯1, θ1) +B2(q¯2, θ2)]− (ψ1 + ψ2) .
δi and ∆ are random variables evaluated at equilibrium prices and allocations. Below we
will refer to the expected country-specific and expected aggregate EA by simply using the
terms ‘individual’ / ‘country-specific’ and ‘aggregate’ EA, respectively.
3 Analytical results
This section defines the three components that constitute E[∆], relates them to existing
literature, and highlights the analytical contributions of the current paper. In Proposition
1, we show how E[∆] is split between the countries and characterize the cases where
one country may be worse off under linking even when aggregate economic advantage
9Formally, country-specific EA can be written as the difference between private benefits net of
permit costs, minus emission damages, plus initial permit holders’ rents, under linking and under
autarky, where the former must also account for the sunk costs of linking. This corresponds to
δi = [Bi(qLi, θi)− pLqLi −Di(qLi + qLj) + pLq¯i − ψi]− [Bi(qAi, θi)− pAiqAi −Di(qAi + qAj) + pAiq¯i].
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is positive, i.e. E[∆] > 0. We then study the permit price variability under linking and
autarky. In Proposition 2 we spell out the condition under which a country with E[δi] > 0
faces an increase in price volatility relative to autarky. All proofs are provided in Appendix
B.
Definition. Given pair characteristics {(ψ1, σ1), (ψ2, σ2), ρ} where ψi > 0, σi ≥ 0 and
ρ ∈ [−1, 1] for i = 1, 2, define pair size effect (PSE), volatility effect (V E) and dependence
effect (DE) as
PSE(ψ1, ψ2) =
ψ1ψ2
2b2 (ψ1 + ψ2)
,
V E(σ1, σ2) = σ
2
1 + σ
2
2,
DE(σ1, σ2, ρ) = −2σ1σ2ρ.
We start with a few remarks about these effects. First, PSE is increasing in each of its
arguments so that larger linked systems feature a greater PSE. However, for a given
total size of the linked countries, ψ1 + ψ2 = ψ˜, PSE is maximized when ψ1 = ψ2 =
ψ˜/2. Conversely, in a link where country sizes differ, the smaller country determines
the magnitude of PSE. Second, V E is positive except in the trivial case when shock
variances are zero in both countries. Third, DE is decreasing in ρ, may be positive or
negative depending on the sign of ρ but it can never be larger than V E in absolute value,
i.e. |DE| ≤ V E. The interplay of these effects and E [∆] are described in the following
lemma.
Lemma. Let  ≥ 0, then E [∆] = PSE (V E +DE)− (ψ1 + ψ2) .
In words, aggregate EA is the sum of volatility and dependence effects scaled by the pair
size effect net of sunk costs. Taking a step back, E [∆] is increasing in the participating
countries’ sizes and shock variances but decreasing in the correlation of shocks and the
sunk costs.10 In a recent theoretical study of the optimal scope of price and quantity
policies, Caillaud and Demange (2015) observe a similar result but limit their analysis to
the analog of our aggregate EA.
10The observation that variability can be beneficial has a long history in economics, e.g. Waugh (1944),
Oi (1961), and Markowitz (1952).
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Two special cases under the assumption of zero sunk costs help intuition. When the
variances of shocks are equal and they are perfectly positively correlated (σ1 = σ2 > 0,
ρ = 1), E[∆] = 0 because V E + DE = 0 regardless of PSE. That is, linking cannot
generate any additional value over autarky because a price wedge never emerges. In effect,
for all possible realizations of the shock pair, the implied autarky prices are always equal.
This eliminates any incentive to trade permits internationally so there is no economic
advantage of linking over autarky. At the opposite extreme is the case with perfect
negative correlation (σ1 = σ2 > 0, ρ = −1) and the economic advantage of linking is at its
maximum. That is, a country prefers the demand in its partner’s market to be perfectly
inversely related to its own because this always generates the largest price wedge. More
generally, for PSE(V E +DE) > 0, we need two conditions to be satisfied i) σi > 0 in at
least one country and ii) ρ < 1 or σi 6= σj. Below, we assume that PSE(V E +DE) > 0.
The effect of PSE on E[∆] notwithstanding, versions of the lemma were noted in other
contexts. For example, in a more general framework, Yates (2002) shows that decentral-
ization, the analog of linking here, is always preferred for uniformly mixed pollutants and
provides an isomorphic comparative advantage formula. As discussed in the introduction,
the production location decision of multinationals (De Meza and Van der Ploeg (1987))
and the optimality of banking and borrowing of tradable pollution permits (Yates and
Cronshaw (2001) and Fell et al. (2012)) can also be viewed in this light. The focus of
these studies is the aggregate EA from the point of view of a single regulator. In con-
trast, Proposition 1 shows how this aggregate value is distributed across countries that
are under the control of independent regulators.
Proposition 1. Let  ≥ 0. Then for i = 1, 2 and i 6= j
E [δi] =
ψj
ψi + ψj
E [∆] + (ψj − ψi) .
An immediate implication of the proposition is that when ψi = ψj, E[∆] is equally shared
between the countries. Moreover, when linking costs are zero  = 0, linking cannot make
the countries worse off. When linking costs are not negligible,  > 0, it is possible to find
pair characteristics such that E[δi] = E[δj] ≶ 0. Put differently, with  > 0 links between
some country pairs will be beneficial, while for others it will not. However, countries in a
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given pair will not disagree on whether the link is worthwhile or not.
There is also no disagreement between countries when ψi 6= ψj and  = 0. In this case, the
larger country receives a smaller share of E[∆]. To see this let ψi > ψj and observe that
in Proposition 1 the share of E[∆] due to country i is ψj/(ψi +ψj). Despite the fact that
country i receives a smaller share, it prefers linking to autarky because 0 < E[δi] < E[δj].
A more interesting case arises when  > 0 which is explored in the following corollary.
Corollary. Assume ψ1 = 1 and ψ2 ∈ (0, 1) without loss of generality. Then E [δ1] < 0 <
E [δ2] and E [∆] > 0 when ˆ satisfies
ψ2
(1 + ψ2)
PSE(V E +DE) < ˆ <
1
(1 + ψ2)
PSE(V E +DE).
Negotiating and implementing a linking agreement may be complicated and costly, and
no link will make economic sense if these upfront costs, , are too high. The corollary
clarifies the condition under which the linking agreement will not be established even if
E[∆] > 0. This is because under the assumed cost sharing rule the regulator in country 1
faces too high costs and will not consent.
Next we consider the cases where both countries are better off under linking and show
that this does not necessarily imply that the price volatility declines in both countries
after linking.
Proposition 2. Assume  ≥ 0 is sufficiently small so E [δi] ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2. More-
over,assume 0 ≤ σ1 < σ2 and ψ1 = 1 without loss of generality. Then V [pA2] > V [pL]
for all allowed pair characteristics and V [pA1] < V [pL] when
ψ2 >
2 (σ21 − σ1σ2ρ)
(σ22 − σ21)
.
In a mutually beneficial link, the permit price volatility always declines in the more
volatile country relative to autarky but that it may increase in the less volatile country.
Put differently, a decline in price volatility is not a necessary condition for linking to be
preferred. This is trivially true when σ1 = 0 and  = 0, because the right hand side of the
inequality is 0. Intuitively, under autarky the marginal benefit in country 1 is constant
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whereas the marginal benefit in country 2 depends on the shock realization. Consequently,
ex post autarky permit price levels will almost surely differ. It is this difference in prices
that makes linking mutually beneficial. This is despite the fact that under linking, country
1 agrees to ‘import’ some volatility from country 2; yet, it is well compensated for doing
so. When σ1 > 0, one must also account for the linking partners’ relative sizes and the
correlation of shocks. As our empirical application in the next section shows, it is not
difficult to satisfy this condition in the real world. Hence, contrary to most people’s
intuition, higher price volatility relative to that under autarky does not necessarily leave
a country worse off.
4 Empirical application
This section demonstrates the economic and policy relevance of our analytical results.
We revert to using the term ‘jurisdiction’, and focus on potential bilateral links that may
be formed amongst the hypothetical ETSs of ten real-world jurisdictions. Our goal is to
illustrate the variation that exists in the empirical counterparts of PSE, VE and DE as
well as the aggregate and jurisdiction-specific EA.
To align our empirical exercise with the theoretical model above, we assume that the
hypothetical ETS in a given jurisdiction covers all carbon emissions, and that jurisdiction-
specific quotas are set so that expected permit prices under autarky are equal. We also
assume that the sunk costs of linking are zero and maintain our assumption that the
jurisdictions in a bilateral link have identical technology. While this assumption lacks
realism, it reduces substantially the data required to calibrate the model. Moreover, in
the next section we argue that it is a conservative assumption in the sense that relaxing
it would strengthen our results.
Our sample includes several countries, i.e. China, USA, Japan, South Korea, Mexico,
and Egypt; a supranational region consisting of the countries which are members of the
European Union plus Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein; a subnational but crucial sector,
namely the power sector in the USA; and two supranational sectors whose emissions are
sizable, rapidly growing, and currently unregulated, i.e. International Aviation (IAB) and
Marine Bunkers (IMB).11 Arguably, the 44 possible linking arrangements between these
11We refer to individual jurisdictions as CHN, USA, JPN, KOR, MEX, EGY, EUR, USPWR, IAB
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jurisdictions are broadly representative of possible future links that may be considered.12
We obtain annual country level carbon dioxide emissions data covering 1950-2012 from
the World Resources Institute.13 We complement this dataset with IAB and IMB emis-
sions data covering 1971-2012 from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, and data for the USPWR emissions covering 1950-2011 from the Energy
Information Administration. We denote an observation from jurisdiction i and year t
entry by eit.
To calibrate ψi, σi and ρ, we start by noting that in our model the natural logarithm of
laissez-faire emissions are given by
ln
(
qLFi
)
= ln
(
b2
ψi
)
+ ln (b1 + θi) .
We associate each component of ln
(
qLFi
)
with the trend and cyclical components of
emissions obtained using the HP filter introduced by Hodrick and Prescott (1997) with
the penalty parameter λ = 6.25 for annual data. This is in the spirit of Doda (2014) and
consistent with our interpretation of variation in the marginal benefits of emissions as
being driven by business cycle and/or technology shocks, country-specific events, changes
in the prices of factors of production, weather fluctuations, etc.
Formally, the HP filter decomposes the observed series {ln(eit)} into two time series
{etit, ecit} where ln(eit) = etit + ecit in each year t. Since our model is static, we assume in
each jurisdiction i the final observation of the trend component is related to the size of
the jurisdiction through
ln
(
b2
ψi
)
= eti,2012.
Given our assumption that technology is identical across jurisdictions, the only source of
variation in ψi is the differences in eti,2012. We normalize ψCHN = 100 and set b2 = 0.5. We
note that these amount to choosing the units in which EA is measured. Consequently, the
quantitative results below can be compared across pairs and jurisdictions. However, the
and IMB, respectively.
12We note that the link between USA and USPWR is excluded.
13For China, we exclude observations from 1950-1975 because this period features uncharacteristic
fluctuations associated with the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution.
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value of a particular link and how it is shared between jurisdictions, remains sensitive to
technology differences and, given those differences, to the calibration of ψi. In the context
of our highly stylized model, and without reliable estimates of how b2 may vary across
jurisdictions, we consider our calibration of ψi as a reasonable first pass.
The calibrated values of ψi are provided in Table 1.14 We highlight that these imply that
the largest pairing, that between CHN and USA, has a PSE of 35.5 and the smallest
PSE is between the pair MEX and EGY, e.g. 1.59.
Next, we assume that the cyclical components ecit provide information about the distribu-
tion of the underlying jurisdiction-specific shocks θi. Then given our model, ecit is related
to a draw from the distribution of θi so that
ln(b1 + θi) = e
c
it
We note that ecit obtained using the HP filter is a stationary time series and compute the
standard deviation of θi consistent with the model using
σi = σ (exp (e
c
it)) .
The calibrated σi are provided in Table 2.
Finally, we turn to the calibration of the correlation coefficient ρ. Taking as given the
relationship between θi and ecit implied by our model and discussed above, we calibrate
ρij using
ρij = Corr
(
exp (ecit) , exp
(
ecjt
))
.
The results are given in Table 3, where ρij statistically different from zero at 10% level
are indicated with an asterisk. We observe that ρij can be positive, approximately zero,
or negative. In the former case, the demand for permits will tend to move together in
the two jurisdictions, attenuating the EA of linking through a negative DE. In the lat-
ter case, DE will be positive and augment the EA of linking. Emissions in jurisdictions
whose economies are tightly interconnected through trade and financial flows will likely
move together, especially if jurisdictions’ emissions are procyclical. If the economic links
14Since USPWR data is missing for 2012, we use eUSPWR,2011 to compute ψUSPWR.
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between jurisdictions are weak and/or they are geographically distant, one would expect a
low level of correlation. Finally, if a jurisdiction’s business cycles are negatively correlated
with others, also observing negative correlations in emissions fluctuations would not be
surprising. These conjectures are consistent with empirical studies such as Calderon et al.
(2007) which provides evidence on international business cycle synchronization and trade
intensity, and Doda (2014) which analyzes the business cycle properties of emissions. Fi-
nally, Burtraw et al. (2013) suggest that demand for permits may be negatively correlated
over space due to exogenous weather shocks.
Using Tables 1-3 we calculate {(ψ1, σ1), (ψ1, σ1), ρij} for all pairs in our sample. In turn,
this allows us to compute E[∆] and E[δi] as well as their components PSE, V E and DE.
Before presenting our results, we address a few questions that may arise regarding our
calibration strategy. First, we assume that the pair characteristics are not affected by the
recent introduction of climate change policies. Some emitters in some of the jurisdictions
in our sample are regulated under these policies. We argue that any possible effects would
be limited because these policies have not been particularly stringent, affect only a portion
of the jurisdiction’s emissions, and do so only in the last few years of our sample.
Second, we use the HP filter to decompose the observed emissions series into its trend
and cyclical components. Not surprisingly, the calibrated pair characteristics are altered
somewhat when we alternatively use the band pass filter recommended by Baxter and
King (1999), the random walk band pass filter recommended by Christiano and Fitzgerald
(2003) or the simpler log quadratic/cubic detrending procedures. However, their effect on
the results we discuss below are minimal so we restrict our attention to the HP filter.15
Third, we take the calibrated ρij reported in Table 3 at face value in our computations,
rather than setting insignificant correlations to zero. This does not alter the results in a
meaningful way.
Fourth and finally, we do not view the results of this empirical exercise as precise estimates
of the aggregate or jurisdiction-specific EA of linking. We merely illustrate the variation
that exists so as to provide some guidance for detailed empirical assessments of potential
future links between ETSs in the real world.
We start with an overview of the results for all 44 pairs in Figure 2. The two panels of the
15The results obtained using alternative filters are available upon request.
17
figure show how E[∆] varies with its components, namely PSE and V E+DE. For clarity
of exposition, the axes in each panel use log scales. The main message from both panels is
one of substantial heterogeneity across pairs. Focusing first on the top panel we note that
the pairs that generate the greatest aggregate EA involve the largest jurisdictions in the
sample. However, the relationship is not monotonic, even among the largest jurisdictions.
For example, the link between CHN and USPWR features a greater E[∆] despite having
a smaller PSE than the link between CHN and EUR. For jurisdiction pairs whose PSE
is more moderate, this observation is all the more valid. Consider for example the link
between EUR and IAB, which has the median PSE in our sample and observe that pairs
with similar PSE can generate much larger or smaller aggregate EA, e.g. the JPN link
with KOR and the IAB link with USA, respectively. Similarly, the link between the two
smallest jurisdictions in the sample EGY and MEX, generates more value than the link
between EUR and USA.
Turning to the bottom panel of the figure, it becomes clear why this last link has a small
E[∆]: it has the smallest V E and the smallest DE < 0. USA and EUR are systems
in advanced economies which exhibit low variability in their emissions. Moreover, they
are well integrated through deep trade and financial links so their economic activity and
emissions are highly positively correlated, implying a negative DE. At the other extreme,
we observe a cluster of links which involve EGY, due to the fact that EGY is the most
volatile jurisdiction in the sample which also happens to be negatively correlated with all
the other jurisdictions in the sample. In between the extremes, there is much variability
in E[∆] for a given level of V E+DE. In short, each of V E, DE and PSE can be crucial
for E[∆].
Next we view the results from the perspective of a given jurisdiction. Figure 3 highlights
the case of the three largest ETSs in the sample, namely CHN, USA, and EUR. In this
figure and all panels, the left graph exhibits E[∆] and E[δi], the middle graph V E and
DE, and the right graph PSE when jurisdiction i links with another jurisdiction in the
sample. A crucial feature of these graphs is that linking partners for jurisdiction i are
ordered so that the link with the left-most partner is its most preferred, i.e. has the largest
E[δi].
CHN is by far the largest ETS in the sample so its share of E[∆] is always less than 0.5.
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Under the assumption that all CHN emissions are covered, its most preferred partner is
determined by whether ETS regulation in the United States covers the whole economy,
i.e. USA, or only its power sector, i.e. USPWR. If the American ETS only covers the
latter, CHN is better off in a link with EUR. This is the case despite the fact that the link
between CHN and USPWR has i) a larger V E, ii) a less negative DE and iii) features
a greater E[∆]. It is just not big enough! Assuming links with CHN are not feasible, a
similar reasoning applies in the case of the bilateral links between USA, EUR, and JPN.
In Figure 3, PSE largely determines the ranking of partners. A systematic exception is
the ordering of the links with EGY and IAB for these big jurisdictions. Despite being less
than half as large as the aviation sector, EGY is a preferred partner because its demand
for permits is expected to be volatile and negatively correlated with CHN, USA, and
EUR.16
Finally, we consider the permit price volatility under autarky and linking. In a majority
of cases, linking would imply lower volatility for both partners. However, for 9 out of
the 44 possible pairs, price volatility under linking is higher than under autarky for one
of the partners. This is illustrated in Figure 4 using as an example the pairs in which
EUR is one of the partners. The pairs are ranked according to PSE and the horizontal
line indicates the autarky price volatility in EUR. The bars plot a given partner’s price
volatility under autarky and the price volatility under linking predicted by our model.
In the sample, EUR is the third largest jurisdiction and is characterized by the lowest
permit price volatility under autarky. Linking with larger partners can raise or lower its
permit price volatility, e.g. CHN versus USPWR; so can linking with smaller partners,
e.g. JPN versus MEX. Note also that a link with a very volatile partner does not imply that
price volatility increases, e.g. EGY or KOR. If the variable of interest is price volatility
before and after a link, the message of the figure is clear: one must take the condition in
Proposition 2 seriously. At the same time, we remind the reader that under our maintained
assumption  = 0, all of these links are mutually beneficial.
To summarize, there are good, better, and much better bilateral links among the juris-
dictions in our sample. This is true in aggregate and for individual jurisdictions and
16Illustrations of the results for the remaining jurisdictions in the sample, i.e. those involving sectors
and smaller countries, are available from the authors upon request.
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regardless of whether price volatility decreases or not. However, it is not readily obvious
which potential partner is better. Not all carbon dates are created equal and one must
be careful in selecting a partner.
That said, care must be taken with the interpretation of these results. In particular,
we do not view them as a precise guide for policymakers in jurisdictions contemplating
a link, but rather as a first pass analysis of the economic cost savings that feature in
the policymakers’ calculus. The decision to create a link will be based on a variety of
considerations beyond cost-effectiveness. While our results shed new light on how the
bottom-up international architecture of tradable permit programs could evolve given the
cost savings, we abstract from non-economic benefits as well as the considerable political
and regulatory challenges that could arise in the context of linking.
5 Sensitivity to key assumptions
In this section we discuss the sensitivity of our results to key assumptions we make,
namely those regarding technologies, cost sharing rule, cap setting framework, and interior
solution.
Technology differences The asymmetry in our model is dictated by the size of each
country. Countries’ abatement technologies are assumed to be identical. Relaxing this
assumption is straightforward. To this end, replace the size parameter ψi with γi =
γ(βi, ψi) = ψi·βi where βi is an independent determinant of abatement costs at the margin.
The new parameter γi jointly captures the combination of abatement technology and size
of country i and allows us to explicitly model the differences in abatement opportunities.
Analytically, this change of variable has no consequence for our results. In particular, a
higher βi for a given size is observationally equivalent to an appropriately chosen ψi for
a given abatement technology. When looking for a partner, countries seek one that has a
large γi and in our simple framework it is irrelevant whether a large γi is due to a large
ψi or a large βi.
Empirically, our key result that there is substantial, economically meaningful, and policy
relevant variation in the EA of alternative pairs is reinforced. To see this, observe that in
the top panel of Figure 2 China, due to its size, is systematically a partner in the linking
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arrangements that generate the largest EA. It is also the country with the greatest low-cost
abatement opportunities, i.e. a large βi which is absent from the model by construction.
Allowing it will amplify the technology-adjusted size of China meaning that our results
constitute a lower bound for the variation that we highlight in Section 4.
Cost sharing rules The corollary to Proposition 1 shows that even when the aggregate
EA of linking is positive, autarky can be preferable to one partner when its linking costs
are sufficiently large to offset the benefits. Therefore, the economic viability of linking
depends on how countries share costs and, ultimately, the net benefits. Given the breadth
of situations for which cost sharing rules are relevant, one could consider alternative mech-
anisms motivated by different criteria. We believe that the exogenous linking costs being
shared according to country size is a natural starting point and note that Proposition 1
is sufficiently general to allow the implementation of other rules. That said, we abstract
from side payments and strategic manipulation of cost sharing rules to ensure the forma-
tion of all pairs with E[∆] > 0. This promising line of research is beyond the scope of the
current paper.
Cooperative and non-cooperative cap setting We consider sovereign regulators
who can design and implement policies independently. This is an important conceptual
difference from the studies cited in the introduction. We also assume that linking takes
place only when both regulators agree ex ante to link and that the quotas are independent
of the linking decision. Against this backdrop, it is natural to start from a non-cooperative
solution to the quota-setting problem which is the benchmark case we discuss above. In
Appendix A we set up and solve a joint optimization problem where the two regulators
maximize the expected total net benefits when setting the quotas and show that our
analytical results are the same under both regimes. While our results are robust along
this dimension, our paper is silent on the potential interaction between the levels of quotas
and the linking decision itself. Our work on this topic is ongoing.
Interior equilibrium Throughout the paper we restrict our attention to interior equi-
libria. In essence, this is a restriction imposed on the shocks such that countries’ caps
are binding and permit prices are non zero. In Appendix C we use a simple example to
provide a detailed exposition of what interior equilibrium means in our context and the
conditions under which the equilibrium would not be interior. This assumption allows
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substantial simplification in obtaining analytical results because damages under autarky
and linking are equal, and cancel out, when computing country-specific EA. Moreover,
restricting our attention to interior equilibria allows us to uniquely determine the linking
price pL without arbitrarily specifying who is making the price, i.e. bargaining power be-
tween the permit buyer and the permit seller. Finally, replacing the interior equilibrium
assumption with one about bargaining power, we can proceed numerically to obtain very
similar results because corner solutions are typically rare.
6 Conclusions
We use a simple model to evaluate the economic advantage of regulating carbon emis-
sions by linking the ETSs of two jurisdictions versus operating them under autarky. The
paper’s main innovation is in quantifying and analyzing the sensitivity of aggregate and
jurisdiction-specific economic advantage to the characteristics of the jurisdictions. We
decompose the economic advantage of linking into pair size, volatility, and dependence
effects. We identify conditions on the parameters describing the nature of the uncertainty
in the model and exogenous sunk costs under which one, but not the other jurisdiction,
prefers autarky even when the aggregate economic advantage of linking is positive. We
show that permit price volatility does not necessarily decline under linking as many would
expect, and identify a condition under which it increases for one partner in mutually ben-
eficial links. In an empirical application, we calibrate pair characteristics to the observed
emissions in ten key jurisdictions including China, USA, Europe, and international avi-
ation and shipping. We document substantial variation in economic advantage and its
components when the hypothetical ETSs in these jurisdictions are linked to demonstrate
that the ‘linking partner match’ exercise can be crucial.
The analytical and quantitative results above speak directly to a topical policy debate,
namely the use of markets in responding to the climate change externality. Indeed, the
Paris Agreement, which was adopted by 195 countries during the 21st Conference of
Parties, contains trading provisions which support the use of ‘internationally transferred
mitigation outcomes’. The ultimate aim of these provisions is to improve the cost effec-
tiveness of global emissions reduction efforts. As the signatories to the Agreement ramp
up their ‘Nationally Determined Contributions’, the so-called NDCs, and the low-cost
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mitigation opportunities become more scarce, enhancing the cost effectiveness of such
efforts via linking is likely to become increasingly prominent in national and international
policy fora.
Our study is only a first-pass analysis of the issues that arise in the context of linking
ETSs and leaves several important questions for future research. First, our static analysis
takes as given the quotas under both linking and autarky. A dynamic analysis of linking
and quota setting incentives of regulators is clearly called for. Second, we assume linking
costs are shared according to size. Although this is a natural starting assumption, the
likelihood of the success of a linking arrangement could be increased via means of lump
sum side payments or changes in the cost sharing rules. Conversely, unilateral imposition
of distortionary taxes to capture a greater share of the value generated in a linking ar-
rangement will reduce the chances of the link being formed in the first place. Third, we
only consider the linking of ETSs which have identical design features. This assumption
can be relaxed by allowing differences in the stringency of enforcement, eligibility of offset
credits, cost-containment provisions, and common definition of emissions. Finally, emis-
sions trading is but one of the policy instruments for regulating emissions and there is no
reason why linkages between permit markets and markets for other instruments such as
energy efficiency certificates, renewable obligations, etc. cannot be envisioned.
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Tables
Table 1: Calibrated values of size parameter ψi
CHN USA EUR USPWR JPN IMB KOR IAB MEX EGY
ψi 100 55.038 38.699 23.223 12.966 6.708 6.645 5.089 4.904 2.356
Table 2: Calibrated values of shock standard deviation σi
CHN USA EUR USPWR JPN IMB KOR IAB MEX EGY
σi 0.028 0.019 0.017 0.021 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.028 0.026 0.050
Table 3: Calibrated values of shock correlation ρij
CHN EGY EUR IAB IMB JPN KOR MEX USA USPWR
CHN 1.000
EGY -0.395* 1.000
EUR 0.460* -0.101 1.000
IAB 0.496* -0.279* 0.507* 1.000
IMB 0.194 -0.148 0.534* 0.359* 1.000
JPN 0.394* -0.123 0.461* 0.315* 0.385 1.000
KOR 0.247 -0.397* 0.277* 0.041 0.221 0.360* 1.000
MEX -0.244 -0.174 0.086 0.185 0.255 0.269* -0.138 1.000
USA 0.525* -0.186 0.652* 0.637* 0.523 0.347* 0.419* 0.080 1.000
USPWR 0.220 -0.146 0.581* 0.551* 0.525 0.297* 0.302* 0.110 na 1. 000
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Figures
Figure 1: Graphical illustration of country-specific linking benefits
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Figure 2: Overview of the results
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Figure 3: Large jurisdictions and their partners
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Figure 4: Permit price volatility under linking and autarky
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Appendix
A Alternative solutions to the quota-setting problem
Non-cooperative quotas
Given the set-up presented in Section 2, we solve the control problem of two risk-neutral regulators in
a second best world where non-cooperative emission caps must be fixed ex ante. This is without loss
of generality. All propositions in Section 3 hold under a cooperative framework and risk-aversion as
well. We present the cooperative equilibrium solution below for comparison. First best emissions are not
presented here but are available upon request from the authors.
We maximize the aggregate net benefits of one country given the other country’s emission quota. Formally,
we solve the following system
max
q1≥0
E [B1(q1, θ1)−D1(q1 + q2)] given q2 = q¯2, (A.5)
max
q2≥0
E [B2(q2, θ2)−D2(q1 + q2)] given q1 = q¯1.
The solution to the problem in (A.5) is denoted by a pair of emissions quotas {q¯1, q¯2} which is obtained
by setting the country’s expected marginal benefits equal to its marginal damages:
q¯i =
ψi (b1 − d1)
d2 (ψ1 + ψ2) + b2
, (A.6)
Q¯ =
(ψ1 + ψ2) (b1 − d1)
d2 (ψ1 + ψ2) + b2
.
The non-cooperative linking equilibrium is defined in the text in Equation (3).
Cooperative quotas
Formally, the cooperative program is
max
{q1≥0,q2≥0}
E [B1(q1, θ1)−D1(q1 + q2) +B2(q2, θ2)−D2(q1 + q2)] . (A.7)
The solution to the problem in (A.7) is denoted by a pair of emissions quotas {q¯c1, q¯c2} which is obtained
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by setting expected marginal benefits equal to aggregate marginal damages:
q¯ci =
ψi (b1 − 2d1)
2d2 (ψ1 + ψ2) + b2
, (A.8)
Q¯c =
(ψ1 + ψ2) (b1 − 2d1)
2d2 (ψ1 + ψ2) + b2
.
We have emphasized the difference with respect to q¯i in bold. It is straightforward to show that quotas
selected cooperatively are more stringent than quotas selected non-cooperatively. As such, the resulting
cooperative linking equilibrium features a higher permit price pcL given by
(pcL, q
c
L1, q
c
L2) =
(
Kc +
ψ1θ1 + ψ2θ2
ψ1 + ψ2
, q¯c1 − nc, q¯c2 + nc
)
(A.9)
where Kc = b1 − b2(b1−2d1)b2+2d2(ψ1+ψ2) = b1 − b2ψi q¯ci . Notwithstanding, the amount of permits traded nc = n as
in Equation (3). Namely, it is the same under both regimes and the analytical results about the EA and
the country-specific benefits remain unaltered.
B Proof of Lemma and Propositions
Proof of Lemma
We first evaluate the aggregate economic advantage of linking over autarky. Substituting n = 1b2
ψ1ψ2
(ψ1+ψ2)
(θ2 − θ1)
in the third line of Equation (4), we obtain
∆ = −n(b1 + θ1)− b2
2ψ1
(−2q¯1n+ n2)− ψ1+ n(b1 + θ2)− b2
2ψ2
(2q¯2n+ n
2)− ψ2
= n(θ2 − θ1) + n
(b2q¯1
ψ1
− b2q¯2
ψ2
)
− b2
2
(n2
ψ1
+
n2
ψ2
)
−
(
ψ1 + ψ2
)

= n
[
θ2 − θ1 − nb2
2
ψ1 + ψ2
ψ1ψ2
]
−
(
ψ1 + ψ2
)

=
1
2b2
ψ1ψ2
ψ1 + ψ2
(θ2 − θ1)2 −
(
ψ1 + ψ2
)
.
Using (2), we derive the expression for the expected aggregate EA which completed the proof of the
Lemma:
E [∆] =
1
2b2
ψ1ψ2
ψ1 + ψ2
E(θ2 − θ1)2 − (ψ1 + ψ2)
=
1
2b2
ψ1ψ2
ψ1 + ψ2
(σ21 + σ
2
2 − 2σ1σ2ρ)− (ψ1 + ψ2).
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Proof of Proposition 1
We now evaluate the country-specific economic advantage of linking over autarky. Substituting n =
1
b2
ψ1ψ2
(ψ1+ψ2)
(θ2 − θ1) in the first line of Equation (4), we obtain
δ1 = −n(b1 + θ1)− b2
2ψ1
(−2q¯1n+ n2) + pLn− ψ1
= n
[ψ1θ1 + ψ2θ2
ψ1 + ψ2
− θ1 − b2
2ψ1
n
]
− ψ1
= n
ψ2
2(ψ1 + ψ2)
(θ2 − θ1)− ψ1
=
ψ1ψ
2
2
(ψ1 + ψ2)2
(θ2 − θ1)2
2b2
− ψ1
=
ψ2
ψ1 + ψ2
∆ + (ψ2 − ψ1).
Evaluating the second line of Equation (4), we obtain
δ2 =
ψ1
ψ1 + ψ2
∆ + (ψ1 − ψ2).
And the expected country-specific EA is
E[δi] =
ψj
ψi + ψj
E[∆] + (ψj − ψi).
Finally, while n is identical under cooperative and non-cooperative quotas, comparing (3) and (A.9) we
note that pL 6= pcL. However, this difference has no implication for δi above. To see this note that in
moving from the first to the second line in the derivation of δ1, the terms generating the difference cancel
out.
35
Proof of Proposition 2
Let us first evaluate the variance of the equilibrium prices using (1), (2), and (3). The autarky and linking
price volatilities are
var(pA1) = σ
2
1 ;
var(pA2) = σ
2
2 ;
var(pL) =
1
(ψ1 + ψ2)2
(
ψ21σ
2
1 + ψ
2
2σ
2
2 + 2ψ
2
1ψ
2
2σ1σ2ρ
)
.
Assume 0 ≤ σ1 < σ2 and, without loss of generality, let ψ1 = 1. The volatility of the autarky permit
price in country 2 is larger than the volatility of the linking permit price if
σ22(1 + ψ2)
2 > σ21 + ψ
2
2σ
2
2 + 2ψ
2
2σ1σ2ρ
σ22 + 2ψ2σ
2
2 + ψ
2
2σ
2
2 > σ
2
1 + ψ
2
2σ
2
2 + 2ψ
2
2σ1σ2ρ
(σ22 − σ21) + 2ψ2(σ22 − σ1σ2ρ) > 0.
which trivially holds under the assumption σ2 > σ1 ≥ 0. and for ∀ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. We now turn to the second
part of Proposition 2. The volatility of the autarky permit price in country 1 is smaller than the volatility
of the linking permit price, var(pA1) < var(pL), if
σ21 + 2ψ2σ
2
1 + ψ
2
2σ
2
1 < σ
2
1 + ψ
2
2σ
2
2 + 2ψ
2
2σ1σ2ρ
ψ2 >
(σ21 − σ1σ2ρ)
(σ22 − σ21)
.
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C Interior equilibrium
We use a simple graphical example to illustrate interior equilibrium. Let ψ1 = ψ2 = 1 which implies
q¯1 = q¯2 = q¯. The top panel of Figure C.5 illustrates the permit market equilibria under autarky and
linking for a given pair of shock realizations where 0 = θ2 < θ1. Country 1 faces a positive shock; the red
solid line represents the marginal benefit curve consistent with θ1 > 0. Country 2 faces a zero shock and
its marginal benefit curve is described by the green solid line. When the two systems are linked, country
1 imports |n| permits from country 2. In this case LE is interior because |n| < q¯ and pL > 0. Similarly,
both AE are interior because 0 < pA2 < pA1.17
The bottom panel of Figure C.5 illustrates a (θ1, θ2) pair consistent with the equilibrium solutions just
discussed. In addition, the shaded area in the figure indicates all shock pairs for which both AE and
LE are simultaneously interior. AE are interior for all (θ1, θ2) pairs in the region to the northeast of the
intersection of the orange lines. Similarly, LE is interior for all (θ1, θ2) pairs between the positively sloped
blue lines and to the northeast of the negatively sloped blue line. The positively-sloped lines constrain n
to the interval (−q¯, q¯). However, a subset of this region must be excluded because below the negatively
sloped line, where both shocks are large and negative, pL = 0.
17The standard theoretical approach to comparing price and quantity policies is strictly interior.
Goodkind and Coggins (2015) extend the comparison to account for the possibility of corner outcomes.
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Figure C.5: Autarky and Linking
 
PANEL A: Permit Market Equilibrium 
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